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Scams and other malicious attempts to influence people are continuing to proliferate across the globe,
aided by the availability of technology that makes it increasingly easy to create communications that
appear to come from legitimate sources. The rise in integrated technologies and the connected nature of
social communications means that online scams represent a growing issue across society, with scammers
successfully persuading people to click on malicious links, make fraudulent payments, or download
malicious attachments. However, current understanding of what makes people particularly susceptible
to scams in online contexts, and therefore how we can effectively reduce potential vulnerabilities, is
relatively poor. So why are online scams so effective? And what makes people particularly susceptible to
them? This paper presents a theoretical review of literature relating to individual differences and
contextual factors that may impact susceptibility to such forms of malicious influence in online contexts.
A holistic approach is then proposed that provides a theoretical foundation for research in this area,
focusing on the interaction between the individual, their current context, and the influence message
itself, when considering likely response behaviour.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the CC BY license
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).1. Introduction
The rapid expansion of mobile technology and computer-
mediated communication in recent years has facilitated greater
opportunities for social communication that crosses geographical
divides. However, this growth has also increased opportunities for
what has been termed ‘social engineering’ (Anderson, 2008),
whereby scammers and other opportunists attempt to influence
others to engage in particular behaviours online for financial or
other malicious gain. This can range from sending targeted phish-
ing e-mails that encourage recipients to click on links, provide
personal information or download malicious software, to engaging
in complex online romance scams that persuade targets to transfer
large sums of money over a period of time (Atkins & Huang, 2013;
Whitty & Buchanan, 2016).
Victims of scams can suffer significant financial and psycho-
logical distress (Deem, 2000; Ganzini, McFarland, & Bloom, 1990;
OFT, 2006; Pascoe, Owen, Keats, & Gill, 2006; Spalek, 1999; Titus
& Gover, 2001), whilst the use of techniques to gain access toams).
r Ltd. This is an open access articlecorporate information or to disrupt services can have substantial
consequences at a wider societal level (The Guardian, 2014; The
Washington Post, 2013). In order to counter this threat it is
crucial to understand why some people seem to be more suscep-
tible to malevolent influence than others, so that targeted and
effective mitigations can be developed. This paper explores the
specific influence techniques that are often exploited in such sce-
narios and the potential impact of a range of individual and
contextual factors on susceptibility to these techniques. It then
presents an initial model of individual susceptibility that will allow
the precise relationship between these factors to be further
investigated in the future.2. Scams in the online environment
The perpetrators of online scams create scenarios in which a
target feels sufficiently confident to respond, often using
emotionally oriented triggers related to panic, excitement, curiosity
or empathy, to encourage errors in judgement and decision making
(Langenderfer & Shimp, 2001). Such scenarios can include lottery
wins, psychic communicators, the suspension of online accounts
and online romance. The growth of the internet has provided aunder the CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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approaches, with people who have not traditionally been the target
of fraud becoming more accessible despite their geographic dis-
tance from the perpetrators location (Button, Nicholls, Kerr, &
Owen, 2014).
The relative anonymity provided by online communications
means that perpetrators of scams are also able to strategically edit
the information that they present, with little chance that their
targets will be able to directly verify or challenge this. Such ease of
manipulation means that scammers can maximise the likelihood
that they will be viewed positively by recipients, and therefore are
more likely to be trusted (Walther, 1996). Social media platforms
provide extensive opportunities for scammers to identify infor-
mation regarding individuals' interests, occupation, social net-
works and geographic location (Hong, 2012), allowing scams to
become increasingly personalized and effective (Jagatic, JohnSon,
Jakobsson, & Menczer, 2007).
Finally, when people deceive others online, they do not appear
to experience the negative emotions associated with face-to-face
deception, such as fear or guilt, which has led to the suggestion
that differing social norms or ethical judgements govern online
interactions (Cromwell, Narvaez, & Gomberg, 2005). This likely
contributes to findings that young people who do not appear to be
vulnerable offline can become vulnerable in online settings due to
increased levels of disclosure and lowered inhibition in online
settings (European Online Grooming Project et al., 2012; Suler,
2004).
2.1. Primary mechanisms of online influence
Attempts to influence people online are commonly referred to
as ‘social engineering’ (Atkins & Huang, 2013) and focus on
encouraging individuals to perform an unsafe action, such as
opening an e-mail attachment containing malware, or persuading
people to divulge confidential information, such as user accounts or
passwords (Mitnick & Simon, 2006). For example, phishing e-mails
contact individuals under the guise of an established and trusted
organisation or institution (Greitzer et al., 2014), increasingly
featuring logos andwebsite links that appear legitimate (Workman,
2008).
Real world events may be included in the narrative of the
message to validate the communication (Freiermuth, 2011) and a
number of techniques that exploit social norms and obligations are
often present (Button et al., 2014; Cialdini, 2007; Karakasiliotis,
Furnell, & Papadaki, 2006; Modic & Lea, 2013; OFT, 2009; Raman,
2008; Rusch, 1999; Stajano & Wilson, 2011) These include the use
of reciprocity (e.g., providing gifts or favours so that people feel
obliged to respond), conformity (e.g., referencing the actions and
behaviours of peers so that people feel a pressure to conform) or
authority (e.g., using authority figures that people feel obliged to
comply with). Instilling a sense of urgency in respondents is also
common, with time-pressured deadlines encouraging people to
make decisions quickly rather than systematically considering po-
tential options (Atkins & Huang, 2013; Langenderfer & Shimp,
2001; OFT, 2009). Perpetrators of scams may also evoke feelings
of empathy and similarity, which can result in a target believing
that they share the same expectations and goals as the person they
are interacting with (Cukier, Nesselroth, & Cody, 2007). Specific
examples of how such techniques are commonly used in online
scams are shown in Table 1.
The Elaboration Likelihood Model (ELM; Petty & Cacioppo,
1986) and the Heuristic-Systematic Model (HSM; Eagly &
Chaiken, 1993) both suggest that the effectiveness of persuasive
techniques such as those above is likely to depend on the depth of
message processing that an individual engages in when a messageis encountered. Recent models of phishing susceptibility, such as
the Suspicion, Cognition and Automaticity Model (SCAM;
Vishwanath, Harrison, & Ng, 2016) and the Integrated Information
Processing Model (Vishwanath, Herath, Chen, Wang, & Rao, 2011),
highlight the role of individual differences in likely processing
depth and the resultant impact on response behaviour. Whether an
individual engages in deep, systematic consideration of message
content is also likely to be impacted by the design of the message
itself (Aditya, 2001; Xiao & Benbasat, 2011).
3. Individual differences: are some people more susceptible?
Research has suggested that a small number of people appear to
be at risk of repeat victimisation by fraudsters (Button, Lewis, &
Tapley, 2009; OFT, 2009), however, there is a lack of research
regarding individual differences in susceptibility to online scams,
primarily due to under-reporting, difficulty accessing populations,
and little experimental work in this area. Recent research related to
phishing emails in particular has suggested that people have a
tendency to underestimate their vulnerability to phishing attacks
(Halevi, Lewis, & Memon, 2013), with factors such as gender, age,
familiarity with the sender, and awareness of phishing risk all being
tentatively suggested to impact detection success (Dhamija, Tygar,
& Hearst, 2006; Downs, Holbrook, & Cranor, 2006; Jagatic et al.,
2007; Jakobsson, Tsow, Shah, Blevis, & Lim, 2007). Vishwanath
et al. (2011) argue that both factors related to the phishing mes-
sage itself and wider individual differences, such as previous
experience and beliefs, can impact susceptibility by influencing the
information processing strategies that are used. For instance, in-
fluence techniques contained within the message, such as urgency
cues, can monopolise attentional resources at the expense of other
information that may expose the deception, such as the email
source or spelling.When individuals demonstrate habitual patterns
of e-mail use, this can further increase susceptibility to phishing
attempts (Vishwanath, 2015; Vishwanath et al., 2011).
A lack of research regarding individual differences in suscepti-
bility to online scams means that findings from other fields must
provide the basis for theoretical development in this area. Research
related to consumer behaviour, persuasion and decision making
suggest a number of trait and state-induced individual difference
factors that may impact susceptibility to malicious influence online.
While it is acknowledged that these factors require further inves-
tigation in relation to scam responding, they provide an initial
framework for discussion and are presented below.
3.1. Self-awareness
Although individuals can be experimentally induced to focus
attention on themselves (Duval &Wicklund, 1973), the disposition
for self-focused attention is an individual difference factor that has
been related to resistance to influence (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss,
1975). Individuals high in self-awareness (whether trait or state-
induced) have been shown to consider their personal knowledge,
internal norms and attitudes to a greater degree when making
decisions, leading to increased resistance to social influence and
persuasion attempts (Hutton & Baumeister, 1992). However, when
individuals perceive themselves as similar to the protagonist within
a message, such self-focused attention can also increase suscepti-
bility to persuasive charity messages, with individuals showing
enhanced resistance only when they consider themselves dissim-
ilar to the message protagonist (Hung & Wyer, 2014).
An awareness of self is a required aspect of self-affirmation,
whereby people reflect upon values and attributes that are
important to them. In relation to health messages, self-affirmation
has been linked with lower resistance to threatening health
Table 1
Common influence techniques used in online scams.
Influence Technique Application in Online Scams
Authority Posing as authority figures or institutions,
such as police, banks or senior personnel
Liking Creating profiles that portray trusted
traits or appear friendly
Conformity Suggesting that other people have
benefited from responding
Commitment
& Consistency
Requesting a small upfront fee
(e.g., advance fee fraud)
Reciprocity Providing a free gift or favour
Scarcity Instigating a time-limit in responding
Reward The promise of rewards, whether
monetary or psychological
Loss Claiming that a failure to respond
will lead to a loss of some kind,
such as account closure
E.J. Williams et al. / Computers in Human Behavior 72 (2017) 412e421414messages when the threat is considered personally relevant (e.g.,
smokers who view graphic warnings on cigarette packs; Harris,
Mayle, Mabbott, & Napper, 2007). Since Klein and Harris (2009)
have shown that individuals who are self-affirmed display an
attentional bias toward threat-specific information in such con-
texts, it may be that self-affirmation prevents the use of denial or
other strategies when viewing threatening messages that contra-
dict an individual's current behaviour. This may lead to such in-
dividuals actually being more susceptible to online scams that use
threat-based influence techniques, such as phishing e-mails
focused on the potential suspension of an online account, partic-
ularly if they resonate with the individual's current behaviour, such
as failing to monitor bank accounts for suspicious transactions.
However, there may be situations in which the wider context
makes it difficult for individuals to focus on, or act in relation to,
their inherent values and beliefs. Pitesa and Thau (2013) demon-
strated that individuals in positions of power within an organisa-
tion are able to be more self-focused, more resistant to social
influence and thus more likely to act in accordance with their
personal preferences than those in less powerful positions, due to
decreased dependence on those around them (Guinote, 2007).
3.2. Self-control
Resisting influence attempts is a hard task that requires in-
dividuals to expend cognitive effort and resources in order to
regulate their behaviour (Fransen & Fennis, 2014). A lack of self-
control has been associated with compulsive behaviours, such as
impulse-buying (Roberts & Manolis, 2012), that are likely to have
parallels with susceptibility to scams due to their focus on heuristic
processing rather than long-term, systematic evaluation. When
people are tired (Welsh, Ellis, Christian, &Mai, 2014), have recently
expended cognitive effort by making decisions (Vohs et al., 2008),
or lack the motivation or ability to focus on controlling their
behaviour, susceptibility to influence is likely to be higher as in-
dividuals rely on heuristic, automatic processing mechanisms and
social information. A recent study supports the potential relation-
ship between self-control and online influence through the ex-
amination of susceptibility to phishing attacks in social media
environments. Vishwanath (2015) highlighted that habitual Face-
book use, defined as (a) frequent use, (b) maintenance of a large
network and (c) deficiency in ability to regulate behaviour, was the
single biggest predictor of individual victimisation. However, as
suggested by Roberts and Manolis (2012), the lapses in self-control
that allow people to fall victim to online scammers are likely to be
influenced by a combination of individual motivations (i.e., a desire
for money, love or other form of satisfaction) and external stimuli(i.e., a situational opportunity to achieve this, such as a relevant
fraudulent communication or relationship interest).
Baumeister (2002) highlighted two main components consid-
ered to influence self-control by impacting the degree to which
people are able to behave in accordance with their long-term goals
e (1) standards (an individuals values and ideals) and (2)monitoring
(awareness and tracking of one's behaviour). This suggests that any
relationship between self-control and susceptibility to influence
may be mediated by self-awareness. Ego depletion and goal con-
flicts have also been found to be negatively associated with self-
control, such that individuals who do not have clear and consis-
tent goals, are emotionally distressed, or have insufficient mental
strength to override impulses are more prone to failures of self-
control and susceptibility to influence (Roberts & Manolis, 2012).
3.3. Self-deception
The capacity to deceive ourselves and deny information in the
surrounding environment has been suggested to provide a self-
preservation or self-enhancement function (for review, see von
Hippel & Trivers, 2011). For instance, Fein and Spencer (1997)
suggest that people derogate others in order to make themselves
appear better in their own eyes, whilst eye tracking studies have
shown that people orient towards positive information and away
from negative information when they are in a bad mood
(Isaacowitz, Toner, Goren, & Wilson, 2008). Processes such as
retrieval-induced forgetting, whereby continual retrieval of false
information from memory can result in individuals consciously
‘forgetting’ that which they know to be true (Price & Phenix, 2015)
and replacing it with a new truth based on false or exaggerated
information (Arkowitz & Lilienfeld, 2009), may aid the occurrence
of self-deception.
Although the link between self-deception and susceptibility to
malevolent influence such as scams has not been examined, it is
possible that this process is relevant when people who are ordi-
narily risk-averse take a risk in order to fulfil a current environ-
mental need. For instance, individuals in financial difficulty may
respond to a 419 scam, or those who are very ‘emotionally lonely’
may give money to another as part of a ‘romance scam’. In these
situations, one means through which people may engage in such
behaviour despite potential doubts is via processes of denial and
self-deception. To our knowledge, no research has examined this
possibility, but such processes could partially explain why people
do not discuss their activities with family and friends when they are
involved in a potential scam (OFT, 2009).
3.4. Trust
The default communicative stance of individuals is generally to
trust information in the surrounding environment, with the gen-
eral population shown to have what has been termed a truth bias
(Bond & DePaulo, 2006). This truth bias enables people to deal
efficiently with the large amounts of information received by the
senses every day (Gilbert, 1991). Indeed, if the legitimacy of every
piece of incoming information required systematic evaluation,
people's limited cognitive resources would quickly be overloaded.
When people are more often confronted with honest communi-
cations in online settings then they are likely to evaluate future
communications in line with these previous occurrences (i.e., as
trustworthy). If trustworthy communications are considered to be
the “norm”, making a judgement away from this stance will be a
cognitively effortful task (Elaad, 2003; Tversky & Kahneman, 1974).
However, there are situations inwhich people are more aware of
the potential for deception, with people becoming more suspicious
in situations where deception is considered more likely, such as
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1989) or if they operate in environments where deception is
more frequently encountered (Garrido, Masip, & Herrero, 2004;
Hartwig, Granhag, Str€omwall, & Andersson, 2004).
The propensity to trust others has been shown to vary sub-
stantially across individuals (Cole, Leets, & Bradac, 2002; Cramer,
Brodsky, & DeCoster, 2009; Mayer, Davis, & Schoorman, 1995). In
relation to online influence, propensity to trust is likely to vary
according to the beliefs that people hold regarding the potential
risks of online communications and technology in general
(Corritore, Kracher, &Wiedenbeck, 2003; Wang & Emurian, 2005).
The perceived anonymity provided by the Internet is likely to
contribute to findings that individuals have a tendency to self-
disclose more information in online settings compared to face-to-
face (Joinson & Paine, 2007) and means that Internet contexts
may make people both more susceptible and more vulnerable to
influence attempts (Whittle, Hamilton-Giachritsis, Beech, & Col-
lings, 2013).
3.5. Approach to risk
Different individuals have been found to have different pro-
pensities for risk (see Mishra, 2014). Although people's approach to
risk has been suggested to differ according to the particular situa-
tion and domain (i.e., financial vs. recreational) (Ermer, Cosmides,&
Tooby, 2008; Weber, Blais, & Betz, 2002), personality traits such as
low self-control, sensation seeking and impulsivity have all been
associated with risky behaviour across multiple domains (Mishra,
2014). Wider factors have also been shown to influence risk-
taking behaviour, such as unpredictable or disruptive social envi-
ronments (Mishra & Lalumiere, 2008; Simpson, Griskevicius, Kuo,
Sung, & Collins, 2012) and gender, with men found to engage in
more risk-taking behaviour than women (Byrnes, Miller, & Schafer,
1999).
Differences in propensities for risk have been found to relate to
the strategies that people use to seek and process risk-related in-
formation (Yang, Aloe, & Feeley, 2014). Built upon the sufficiency
principle of the HSM (Eagly & Chaiken, 1993) and the subjective
norm component of the Theory of Planned Behaviour (TPB; Ajzen,
1991), the Risk Information Seeking and Processing model (RISP;
Griffin, Dunwoody, & Neuwirth, 1999) claims that the extent to
which an individual systematically seeks and considers risk-related
information relates primarily to their psychological need for in-
formation sufficiency and informational subjective norms (i.e., so-
cial pressures relating to the amount of information that should be
acquired when making risk-based decisions).
Engaging in risk-taking behaviour online has been highlighted
as a vulnerability factor in relation to susceptibility to online
grooming, along with high levels of Internet access and a lack of
parental involvement in Internet use (Whittle et al., 2013). The
European Online Grooming Project et al. (2012) suggested that
victims of online grooming and abuse are likely to be either risk-
takers, who are generally confident, outgoing and extraverted, or
vulnerable people with low self-esteem and low self-confidence.
3.6. Motivation
Individual differences in motivation are likely to be influenced
by both the immediate context that an individual is operating
within (i.e., their specific needs, such as a lack of money to pay
outstanding bills) and by more stable differences in primary mo-
tivators, such as the need for achievement, affiliation or affect (Maio
& Esses, 2001; McLelland, 1988). Differences in motivation have
been linked to personality characteristics such as conscientious-
ness, with the characteristic traits of being careful, considered andhard-working also being linked to an achievement-orientation
(Barrick & Mount, 1991; Hogan & Holland, 2003). Motivation to
engage in complex cognitive activity, shown in the personality trait
of need for cognition (Cacioppo & Petty, 1982), has also been linked
to a greater resistance to misinformation and decision biases
(Carnevale, Inbar, & Lerner, 2011; Hess, Popham, Emery, & Elliott,
2012).
Vishwanath (2015) highlights that the amount of cognitive
effort an individual is willing to expend when processing messages
may differ according to the degree of attitudinal commitment an
individual has to the message sender or subject (Allen & Meyer,
1990). Three components of attitudinal commitment are sug-
gested to influence susceptibility to phishing attacks (Workman,
2008): normative commitment (degree of emotional attachment),
affective commitment (extent of fear of loss) and continuance
commitment (sense of obligation). Since a number of these factors
are likely to be related to susceptibility to various forms of influ-
ence, individual differences in motivation may impact susceptibil-
ity in a variety of ways according to the particular influence
techniques used and scenario that is created. However, the poten-
tial role of these factors has yet to be determined.
3.7. Expertise
Individuals have been found to use different information cues
when attempting to judge the credibility of a website, potentially
due to the degree of expertise they have. For instance, when
Dhamija et al. (2006) showed participants a selection of legitimate
and fake websites, a quarter of them focused on informationwithin
the website itself when judging its credibility (e.g., the presence of
logos), whilst neglecting information from other sources, such as
the URL. Similarly, Fogg et al. (2002) demonstrated that whilst
consumers base their judgements of website credibility on factors
such as attractiveness, experts are more influenced by factors
related to the content and quality of the information shown.
Such findings suggest that people differ in the extent to which
they engage in systematic evaluation when viewing online com-
munications. This can be considered in relation to Sillence, Briggs,
Harris, and Fishwick (2006) proposed 3-stage model of website
trust, whereby individuals are considered to initially engage in
heuristic-based analysis focused on the design and layout of a
website (Stage 1), followed by a more systematic analysis of web-
site content (Stage 2) and finally longer-term interaction with, and
use of, the site (Stage 3). It is possible that some individuals may
jump directly from Stage 1 to Stage 3, leading them to interact with
fraudulent sites before their credibility has been systematically
evaluated. This jump could be due to a range of factors including
distraction, time pressure, misplaced trust, social influence, or over-
confidence.
4. The interaction with context
In section 2, a number of influence techniques were discussed
that are predominantly designed to influence the extent and type of
cognitive processing that an individual engages in when making a
decision. By creating a time pressure, or what is perceived to be a
time pressure, scammers increase the likelihood that people will
use mental shortcuts when making a decision (Stajano & Wilson,
2011). Specifically, this involves exploiting the inherent heuristics
and biases that govern what has been termed System 1 processing
(Kahneman, 2011), a rapid and automatic form of information
processing that evolved to allow humans to process the vast
amounts of information in the surrounding environment quickly
and efficiently. When a decision appears complex or a person is
overloaded with information, a number of heuristics may be used
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Murphy, 2014). In this section, we consider how individuals may
be more or less susceptible to these particular heuristics when
operating in particular contexts or surroundings.
4.1. Heuristics
If individuals have previous experience of a particular situation,
or have been exposed to significant information through themedia,
their judgements may be biased in relation to a particular outcome
(availability heuristic; Kahneman, 2011). In relation to online in-
fluence attempts, techniques that focus on events that are easily
available in memory, either through recent or repeated exposure,
may influence an individual's judgement of the likelihood that a
message is genuine. For instance, lottery scams have been known to
exploit recent media reports of lottery winners so that a lottery win
is perceived as more likely, or hackers may repeatedly set-off false
alarms in systems so that users ignore genuine alarms, considering
them most likely to be continued system malfunction. Alterna-
tively, techniques may focus on activating pre-conceived stereo-
types regarding the trustworthiness of a particular individual or
message (representativeness heuristic; Kahneman, 2011). For
instance, online romance scammers may attempt to embody
particular characteristics and communication styles that people
typically associate with trustworthiness.
Since scams and other online influence attempts are often
designed to inspire an emotional response, such as excitement,
hope, attachment, desire or even fear, people may base their
judgements on emotional responses rather than on systematic
consideration of the various risks and benefits (affect heuristic).
Individuals who are currently experiencing negative emotional
states (such as sadness, anxiety or depression) are also more likely
to focus on short-term goals related to relieving their distress (Isen
& Patrick, 1983), which may make them particularly vulnerable to
certain influence attempts.
Confirmation bias and hindsight bias have relevance for suscep-
tibility to online scams as they allow the presence of evidence in the
environment to be overridden in order to achieve particular goals.
Confirmation bias refers to the human tendency to actively search
for information that confirms current beliefs and expectations and
neglect information that challenges it, whereas hindsight bias re-
fers to the tendency to view previous events as being more pre-
dictable than they actually were. If an individual has a strong desire
for a person to be trustworthy in order to fulfil a current need, as
may occur in online romance scams with individuals who are
particularly lonely or strongly desire attachment, then they may be
more likely to search for information that confirms this belief and
dismiss information that contradicts it. Once individuals have
become the victim of a scam, findings of repeat victimisation in the
future could also be linked to a hindsight bias, whereby previous
scams are dismissed as being different and more predictable than
the current proposition. This dismissal of previous experience may
represent the reactivation of confirmation bias processes for a
second time, with repeat victimisation occurring in a ‘confirmation
- hindsight bias’ cycle.
The influence of cognitive biases and heuristics when making
decisions has received substantial support (Kahneman, 2011),
impacting a number of the judgements that people make every day.
However, of particular concern is the finding that people also show
what has been termed bias blindness, that is, failing to recognise
their own biases and instead claiming that their judgements are
relatively objective. This has been shown even when people
acknowledge that the judgement strategies that they have used are
themselves biased (Hansen, Gerbasi, Todorov, Kruse, & Pronin,
2014). Although such biases can serve a vital function ininformation processing, they can also lead to inaccurate judge-
ments, errors or seemingly irrational decisions, which people think
have been based on objective consideration. Indeed, previous
research has suggested an association between susceptibility to
phishing attacks and the use of inaccurate heuristics when making
decisions (Downs et al., 2006; Hong, 2012).
4.2. Emotions
It is acknowledged that emotions play an important role in the
persuasion process (Dillard & Nabi, 2006). However there is still
only a limited understanding of why, how, and in what circum-
stances techniques such as fear appeals are effective (Ruiter,
Kessels, Peters, & Kok, 2014). Protection Motivation Theory (PMT;
Rogers, 1983) highlights two main processes involved in the pro-
cessing of fear appeals that have recently been applied to cyber
security (Meso, Ding & Xu, 2013) e the extent that any perceived
consequences are considered to be a threat (threat appraisal) and
the extent that the individual feels able to cope with that threat
(coping appraisal). If individuals see a potential response action as
something that they are able and willing to do, then they are likely
to engage in the recommended behaviour in order to reduce the
potential threat (Ruiter et al., 2014). Individuals attempting to in-
fluence others take advantage of such approaches by creating a
scenario that is interpreted as a threat (such as a security breach on
an account) and providing a simple action to reduce this threat
(such as clicking a link to verify account details).
The impact of emotions on responding to online scams has
largely been neglected, despite the fact that current emotional
states may lead individuals to make decisions that are seemingly
irrational to an outsider (Mishra, 2014). To achieve more positive
emotional states, individuals may bemorewilling to take risks (e.g.,
De Vries, Holland, & Witteman, 2008; Fessler, Pillsworth, &
Flamson, 2004; Mishra, Morgan, Lalumiere, & Williams, 2010),
with different emotional states potentially impacting risk-taking to
various degrees (Fessler et al., 2004). For instance, fear may
heighten threat sensitivity, thereby leading to greater risk aversion
(Ohman&Mineka, 2001), whereas anger may result in greater risk-
acceptance in order to achieve ones goals (Fessler et al., 2004).
Social isolation, feelings of alienation from peers and emotional
loneliness have all been highlighted as risk factors for susceptibility
to online grooming, since offenders can exploit the need for
attention that accompanies feelings of loneliness (Whittle et al.,
2013). This is particularly worrying given that socially vulnerable
people may be more likely to use higher-risk communication
platforms, such as online chat rooms (Valkenburg & Peter, 2007).
When people feel emotionally vulnerable or distressed, they have
also been found to have a greater propensity for failures in self-
control and a narrower focus of attention (Fredrickson &
Branigan, 2005; Tice, Bratslavsky, & Baumeister, 2001).
4.3. Culture
The Needs Opportunities Abilities model (Vlek, 2000) highlights
the impact of wider contextual factors such as societal culture,
demography and economy on individual decisions and behaviours.
It is claimed that such factors influence behaviour by influencing
the abilities that an individual has and is able to gain, the oppor-
tunities that are available to them, and their differing needs (e.g.,
wealth, health, attachment).
Culture has been defined as a ‘shared system of socially trans-
mitted behaviour that describes, defines, and guides people's way
of life, communicated from one generation to the next’
(Matsumoto, 2006, p. 220). Differences in propensity to trust across
cultures have been primarily considered in relation to the
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of culture (Jarvenpaa, Tractinsky, & Saarinen, 2000; Weber & Hsee,
1998; Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994). Individualistic cultures pri-
oritise independence and the achievement of personal goals
whereas collectivist cultures prioritise interdependence, relation-
ships and the needs of the in-group over personal needs. Differ-
ences in the trust-building process between these two types of
culture have been suggested, with individualistic cultures associ-
ated with a more calculative process of trust building based on an
evaluation of the costs and benefits to the target (Doney, Cannon,&
Mullen, 1998). Individualists are also more likely to seek out pre-
viously unknown ‘partners’ according to their reputation, whereas
collectivists are more focused on existing relationships in guiding
their interactions (Yamagishi & Yamagishi, 1994).
Cross-cultural differences in propensity to trust are particularly
relevant when attempting to establish trust between people who
are not personally known to each other (termed depersonalized
trust), whereby judgements may be based on perceived similarity,
group membership and potential connections through mutual ac-
quaintances and existing relationships. Yuki, Maddux, Brewer, and
Takemura (2005) explored differences in depersonalized trust be-
tween individualist and collectivist cultures and found that Amer-
icans were more likely to trust strangers if they shared some form
of category group membership, whereas Japanese participants
were more likely to trust strangers with whom they shared direct
or indirect relationship links.
Finally, traits associated with collectivist cultures have also
been associated with a greater tendency to conform to social
norms (Iyengar & Lepper, 1999; Kim &Markus, 1999) and to mimic
the behaviours of those around them (van Baaren, Maddux,
Chartrand, de Bouter, & van Knippenberg, 2003). Given that
different influence techniques may differentially exploit links with
existing social networks, social norms and in-group category
memberships, it is likely that cross-cultural differences in pro-
pensity to trust may be reflected in different patterns of suscep-
tibility to online scams.4.4. Organisation
The norms, habits and values inherent within a workplace are
also known to guide behaviour and influence the assumptions that
people hold when operating in the workplace (Needle, 2004). If
people do not fully understand the potential threats of online
communications, or if engaging in secure online behaviour is
considered to be difficult, then people may be more vulnerable to
engaging in unsecure behaviours, such as clicking on phishing
emails (Sasse, Brostoff, & Weirich, 2002; Virginia Tech, 2011),
particularly if those around them are considered to engage in
similar behaviours.
When people are stressed or under pressure in terms of time or
demands (Klein& Calderwood, 1991), overloaded with information
(Burke, 2010), heavily focused on a primary task (Mack & Rock,
1998) or are using new, unfamiliar technology, their ability to
notice suspicious communications is also likely to be reduced,
whichmay lead to errors in responding (Koumpis et al., 2007). Even
if suspicious communications are noticed, individuals may not feel
they have sufficient time, resources or means to further investigate
these. In such situations, decisions may be made using heuristic
processes based on expectations, hindsight and other biases,
whereby it becomes normal behaviour to ignore or disregard po-
tential risks. In order to counter such issues, Sasse et al. (2007)
highlight the role that system design, organisational behaviour,
and security awareness, education and training can have on po-
tential susceptibility to online influence.5. A holistic theoretical approach
This paper has highlighted a range of individual and contextual
factors that may differentially impact susceptibility to various
forms of malicious influence employed in online settings. For
instance, whilst attempts to extract account details often focus on
exploiting time pressure or an essential requirement to complete a
work task, lottery or investment scams may target those with a
propensity for risk-taking, who are motivated by financial gain,
excitement or challenge. Alternatively, being ‘emotionally lonely’ or
having a particular desire or other unmet need may lead people to
take risks that are counter to their general risk-taking propensity. In
such cases, idealism, hope, desperation or a desire to ‘belong’ may
lead people to deny doubts through a process of self-deception.
Both Pascoe et al. (2006) and Wright and Marett (2014) have
previously proposed frameworks for considering individual differ-
ences in susceptibility to phishing or other forms of fraud. However,
these are focused on dispositional factors, such as personality, or
experiential factors, such as knowledge of security policy, and do
not account for the potential impact of context or state-induced
factors such as emotional state, cognitive capacity or cultural
values. The recently proposed Suspicion, Cognition and Automa-
ticity Model (Vishwanath et al., 2016) attempts to combine con-
cepts related to individual differences in knowledge and cyber risk
with those related to habitual and routine behaviours when
considering evaluations of phishing e-mails. However, in its present
state this does not currently account for how these concepts may
interact with influence techniques, or the range of individual fac-
tors that may influence susceptibility.
In order to fully understand the potential relationship between
individual differences, contextual factors and the influence tech-
niques used that have been identified in this review, a working
model of susceptibility to online influence has been developed that
provides a foundation for future work. Throughout this paper, in-
fluence techniques have been considered to rely on targets
engaging in relatively automatic forms of processing, with
contextual factors potentially increasing or decreasing suscepti-
bility to influence techniques, whether in combination with, or
independently of, individual factors. The extent that individual
difference factors may enhance or moderate effects is currently
unknown and therefore any potential relationships require explo-
ration. Our intention in formulating this proposed approach is to
provide a basis for future experimentation and analysis, in order
that a more coherent framework can be developed regarding the
interaction between the individual, the context they are operating
in, and the influence mechanism used, when considering suscep-
tibility to malicious online influence. Within our model, individual
susceptibility to influence (S IND) has been divided into a range of
sub-factors that can be grouped according to 4 main levels:
 The ‘Who’: Individual traits of the recipient, such as personality
and risk-preference (T IND);
 The ‘When’: The recipients current state, such as their current
mood, degree of self-awareness, cognitive pressure, or fatigue
(St IND);
 The ‘Where’: The context an individual is operating in at the
time, such as whether they are at home or at work, the
communication medium used, and the impact of wider cultural
values (C IND);
 The ‘What’: The influence mechanism that is used, such as
invoking compliance with authority, instigating a time pressure
or appealing to particular emotions (In MECH).
These factors are conceived as likely to impact individual sus-
ceptibility to influence at any given point in time. However, the
S 
IND
= (T IND) + (St IND) + (C IND) + (In MECH )
T 
IND
High 
propensity 
to trust 
Low self-
control
Low self-
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High Risk-
taking
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deception
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finance
Goal 
conflict
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overload
Fatigue
C 
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Relational Cultural 
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In 
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Conformity Authority Liking Loss
Fig. 1. Framework for testing hypotheses based on a holistic individual susceptibility model applied to a workplace phishing attack.
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interactions, both across and within each level, is currently un-
known. To provide an initial focus for investigationwe propose that
the presence of vulnerability factors within each level leads to a
resultant increase in susceptibility, such that an individual with
particular trait vulnerabilities is more susceptible when they are
also in a vulnerable context thanwhen they are in a neutral context.
Since the influence mechanism is likely to have been designed to
exploit particular vulnerabilities at the individual or contextual
levels, message factors may then have a greater impact on sus-
ceptibility by interacting further with these vulnerabilities. How-
ever, alternatively to our proposed hypotheses, it is possible that
the presence of additional vulnerability factors does not further
increase susceptibility, or that certain combinations of factors have
an exponential effect on susceptibility rather than a relatively
linear, additive one. The proposed model therefore provides a basis
to test these possibilities:
Susceptibility to Influence (S IND)¼ (T IND) þ (St IND) þ (C IND) þ (In
MECH)
A number of key sub-factors considered to influence suscepti-
bility within each level have been identified and the proposed
model can be used and extended to develop and test a range of
hypotheses. An example of how these factors may interact using a
workplace phishing attack is shown in Fig. 1. For example, an
employee with a high need for affiliation may prioritise maintain-
ing harmonious relational ties within the workplace. Scenarios
whereby they are fatigued or cognitively overloaded, combined
with occupying a position of relatively low power or status within
the organisation, may make them particularly susceptible to in-
fluence attempts that exploit reciprocity, authority or conformity
(see shaded boxes within Fig. 1).
6. Conclusions
In this paper, we have proposed a holistic framework that will
allow interactions between individual difference factors, contextual
factors, and message factors to be examined and considered in
relation to their impact on individual susceptibility to malicious
online influence. It is hoped that by further understanding what
can make people susceptible to online scams, more effective and
targeted mitigations can be developed in the future. We have also
highlighted a number of open questions regarding susceptibility to
online influence that require further investigation and clarification.
A number of risk factors have been identified that likely increase
susceptibility, but the magnitude of the effects of these differentfactors, and how they interact with other factors, is unknown. For
instance, are these factors additive, in that each additional factor
leads to a set increase in the degree of susceptibility, or are they
multiplicative, in that certain combinations of factors lead to larger
effects? If a particular state-induced factor made an individual 3
more susceptible to influence and a particular context factor made
an individual 2more susceptible to influence, would the presence
of both of these factors increase susceptibility by 5 or 6? Or
would there be no further increase due to the presence of a relative
ceiling of susceptibility?
By understanding the relative contribution of different factors,
and combinations of factors, to susceptibility it may be possible to
address a second open question emerging from this literature,
namely where is the point of intervention that has maximal impact
in increasing secure behaviour? A primary aim of research in this
field is to enhance online safety for individuals, groups and orga-
nisations. Unfortunately current understanding of where best to
target future interventions, and the extent to which these factors
can be effectively tackled at both the individual and organisational
level, is limited and predominantly speculative.
Finally, the relative success of training and education ap-
proaches related to online influence would benefit from further
exploration in order to understand precisely how and when such
techniques work. For instance, do they reduce reliance on heuristic
processing, enhance self-awareness and self-control, or increase
suspicion? Understanding the mechanisms involved in reducing
susceptibility to influence will not only enhance understanding of
the processes involved in increasing it, but will also allow particular
failures in resistance to be examined, such as how and why suspi-
cious individuals may still succumb to scams.
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